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cisions on public opinion. Did Brown v. Board lead to greater or 
less tolerance of blacks by whites? Did Roe v. Wade reduce or in-
crease public hostility to abortion? Does the Court form or follow 
the values of the public or particular segments of the public? Has 
the Court a constituency to which it caters in its constitutional deci-
sions? Are its decisions at a particular slice in time politically co-
herent, like the platform of a political party? Political scientists 
have paid some attention to these questions; legal scholars, very 
little. 
These and many other questions that could be put are designed 
to draw attention away from endless inconclusive debating over the 
pros and cons of particular decisions and toward a study of consti-
tutional law as a social institution having causes and effects. The 
serious pursuit of these questions would require constitutional 
scholars to equip themselves with new analytical tools, to take a less 
tendentious and political view of their subject, to become more-
scholarly. 
PAUL MURPHY2 
I have been reading a doctoral dissertation which one of my 
Ph.D. advisees is completing and was intrigued with a statement by 
a Kentucky judge, William W. Blair, in 1822: 
Judges ... do not sound the alarm upon any supposed violation of the constitution; 
nor do they claim the right to issue their injunction to arrest legislative proceed-
ings. . . . They do not undertake to declare any statute unconstitutional which can 
be carried into execution without their intervention. . . . It is only when the aid of 
judges is called in to assist in executing (statutes) that they claim the privilege of 
examining into the constitutionality of such enactments. They refuse to lend their 
assistance and to become partic1pes criminals in a violation of the constitution; they 
deny to the legislature the power to compel them to become agents in the perpetua-
tion of a crime. Surely this is not an assumption of superiority, but rather an asser-
tion of equality .... 
Looking at constitutional scholarship from the perspective of a con-
stitutional historian, the quote suggests a number of needs. Since 
the "constitutional revolution" of the late 1930s and especially since 
the mandate of Harlan Fiske Stone to the Court in his famous foot-
note 4 in the Carotene Products case of 1938, to focus upon the 
"care and feeding" of the rights of "discrete and insular minorities," 
constitutional historians have tended mainly to follow the Court in 
its gradually reoriented concern for civil liberties and civil rights. 
All to the good. But as a result there have been some casualties of 
underemphasis and underconcern. Stone, as you will recall, urged 
2. Professor of History, University of Minnesota. 
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that legislation restricting personal rights be looked upon as consti-
tutionally suspect, even though state economic regulation would 
now be viewed with a tolerance for legislative discretion. Historians 
have tended to see the mandate as a call for them to focus their 
work on human rights issues as defined largely by case law and the 
courts. In other words, they have been interested in how this new 
concern with minorities-political, economic, religious, racial, eth-
nic-and gender has been played out. 
The result has been that two areas have tended to be neglected. 
One is non-civil liberties and civil rights issues-principally eco-
nomic questions and regulatory matters in all their varied manifes-
tations. This is true at both the federal and state level. To take two 
cases in point, in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976), the 
court for the first time in nearly forty years held that Congress had 
exceeded the limits of its power to regulate commerce, thereby nul-
lifying 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act that ex-
tended minimum wage and overtime requirements to the employees 
of state and local government. These amendments, Justice Rehn-
quist contended, were unconstitutional infringements on state sov-
ereignty. Similarly Justice Sandra Day O'Connor set forth a 
judicial version of the New Federalism, accusing Congress in its 
passage of an energy measure of trying "to kidnap state utility com-
missions," "conscript (them) into the national bureaucratic army," 
reduce "state agencies to bureaucratic puppets of the federal gov-
ernment," and transform the states into "field" offices of the "na-
tional bureaucracy." Such a posture, however, was assailed by 
Justice Blackmun, who claimed that it articulated a view of state 
sovereignty "almost mystical," but also "overstated and patently in-
accurate." We need studies in these areas. To what degree has the 
Court stayed out of state economic activities and with what results, 
especially in the area of federalism? At the federal level, what 
would a study of, for example, anti-trust enforcement tell us about 
constitutional commerce power? Studies of labor law? The FTC? 
The other area which needs special attention from constitu-
tional historians involves Congress and the executive branch and 
constitutional actions and developments of each. We have tended 
to study primarily judicial action. A large amount of congressional 
(or state legislative) behavior in the last fifty years has had impor-
tant constitutional overtones. We seem only to be interested in that 
when the courts are called upon to "arrest legislative proceedings," 
and then seem to look mostly at judicial behavior. How seriously 
do legislators and members of Congress take their oath to support 
the Constitution? 
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Similarly, we need studies of presidential constitutional politics 
and not only of presidential war power and emergency power. 
Harry Truman's expansion of the "imperial presidency" has really 
not been carefully assessed from a constitutional standpoint. 
Neither has Lyndon Johnson's, or for that matter Richard Nixon's 
or Ronald Reagan's, except, of course, when the courts rapped their 
knuckles. The constitutional cavalierness of Reagan administration 
leaders is highly suspect. We need a scholarly assessment of it and 
hopefully before minor bits and pieces of it hit the courts. 
Constitutional behavior occurs in all three branches and at 
both the federal and state level. We, the People also impact consti-
tutional processes-or at least are supposed to. We need to know 
about all this-when it happens, how it happens, why it happens, 
and its results. A step out of our Supreme Court's Constitution 
fixation would, I think, serve us all well. 
JOHN P. ROCHE3 
Our first priority must be to recover from the Bicentennial. I 
knew it was going to be bad when in 1985 a staff member of the 
commission in Washington wrote to suggest that I organize a cos-
tume party for television which would feature leading framers inter-
viewing "Lock, Hobbs, and Montesque" (sic). But even my worst-
case view was overwhelmed by the blast which followed as forests 
were felled to provide paper for God only knows how many books 
and articles, seemingly on any topic that an ingenious author could 
link to the Constitution and its authors. 
Basically I am a tolerant soul. Having grown up listening to 
oracular great aunts tell how Irish-Americans won the Battle of 
Bunker Hill, or Gettysburg, or the Argonne Forest, I could chuckle 
compassionately when various writers ascribed the Constitution's 
organizing principles to the Torah, the "Great Peace" of the Iro-
quois Confederacy, the Koran, or old Norse customary law. And, 
as Madison once noted, turning to Locke or Montesquieu was "a 
field of research which is more likely to perplex than to decide." 
However, what led me to call Leonard Levy and a couple of 
other old friends and suggest a year in Australia was the onslaught 
of the political theologians. One might have thought that the Con-
vention was a Great Council of the Church comparable to Nicea or 
Chalcedon and the framers, like the Church Fathers, animated 
solely by the Paraclete. While I yield to no one in my respect for 
the "Republican Virtue" of the framers, my forty years in the pri-
3. Professor of Law. The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy. 
